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STATEMENT OR THE CASE 
I. 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal generally concerns the constitutionality of the Family Law License 
Suspension Act, hereafter referred to by the parties as "FLLSA", identified 87-1401 et seq., 
Idaho Code; whether a driver's license, issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles of the State 
of Idaho, may be lawfully included within the category of licenses subject to suspension 
proceedings envisioned by FLLSA; whether the Department of Health and Welfare, hereinafter 
referred to as the "Department", and the Hearing Officer has met their the compliance mandates 
and exercised their proper authority under the provisions of FLLSA; whether the Department's 
four defined "exemptions", constituting regulatory "good cause", are intended to eliminate the 
essential element and fiding of "WilIfUIness" in reviewing a failure to comply with a court 
order, and whether such a substitution is Iawfhlly able to be applied in an administrative 
proceeding, when it appears to be inadequate in a judicial setting, as the essential element s of 
non-compliance require a fmding on the issue of willfulness; and whether FLLSA has any lawful 
application to court orders for child support entered into prior to the enactment of this legislation. 
This case concerns an administrative effort to compel enforcement of three (3) separate 
judicial orders entered into between March, 1995 and October, 1996, regarding Appellant's 
obligations of support of three (3) children. 
11. 
Statement of Facts 
On November 20, 1995, a judgment and order was entered by the c o w  requiring 
Appellant to financially support a minor child  born  in the amount 
of $98.00 a month. That order was filed onNovember 22, 1995, in Case No, CV DR 9502071D. 
On September 30, 1996, a judgment and order was entered by the court requiring 
Appellant to financially support a minor child born on , in the amount 
of $153.00 a month. The order was filed on October 1, 1996, in Case No. CV 96-3514C. 
On March 2, 1995, a stipulation and order was entered by the court requiring Appellant to 
financially support a minor child born o  in the 
amount of $136.00 a month. 
The financial records maintained by the Department had determined Appellant had not 
successf%Ily met those monthly obligations, created in 1995 and 1996, and the Department 
undertook to invoke the provisions of the 1997 enactment of the Idaho State Legislature, the 
FLLSA, as a course of action, in an effort to pursue court order enforcement with what the 
Department perceived to be an available remedy to compel an enforcement of these three (3) 
separate judicial orders of support. As of the date of the administrative proceeding on December 
14, 2005, the Department represented the outstanding obligation had grown to a total accrued 
arrearage of $20,904.32. 
The FLLSA, pursuant to 5 7-1402(3), defines a delinquency outstanding under a court 
order to be the amount of unpaid support that has accrued from the date of a child support order, 
excluding the present month, in an amount equal to or greater than the total support owing for the 
period of at least ninety (90) days, or two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), whichever is less. The 
represented arrearage accrued under these orders met that statutory definition, and it was upon 
that basis the administrative proceeding was initiated under the provisions of FLLSA. 
111. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
The Department sent out a Notification of Intent to Suspend Appellant's driver's license, 
and gave him an opportunity to request an administrative hearing, before such suspension 
proceedings would he sought as the Department's remedy of choice in their assessment of 
Appellant's case. 
A response was submitted to the Department, challenging that proposed course of 
enforcement of the support orders, and a hearing was requested. 
A hearing was held before the Hearing Officer, Edward C. Lockwood, on December 14, 
2005. At the hearing, Appellant did not object to the accuracy of the Department's calculations 
of the alleged arrearages and the accrued support deficiencies as determined from the financial 
records maintained by the Department, and Appellant respectfully acquiesced with those 
compilations, as he had suffered a series of financial setbacks, and extended periods of 
unemployment, and had not been able to meet his financial responsibility created by the entry of 
those court orders, each of which preceded the enactment of this new legislation that purported to 
empower an agency with authority to impair certain categories of licenses, as a means of 
compelling enforcement of court orders that involve child support. 
. .  . . .  ... . 
The . - . . FLLSA . did-not provide within its legislation a defhition of what was to be' 
. . . .  
. .  . . .  . 
iiisidered 4s "exemption", or as elements to determined "good causeW,.6r what standards or .  
. . . . . .. . 
. . 
- .. 
. . .  
elements of . . "willfulness" must be considered in reviewing a state of judicial non-compliaici5 
The legislation was silent as to what findings had to be made, and did not address whether there 
must be a showing of willfulness and deliberate indifferent disregard of the court order before 
there can be any imposition of punishment for a failure to perform under court orders. The 
administrative proceeding did not address the concepts of "contempt" as should be the level of 
inquiry before any source of punishment could be imposed over any failure to comply with a 
wurt order, as the law requires a "willfulness" to be shown and a clear showing of deliberate and 
"indifferent disregard" of a duty to obey a court order, as a fundamental and essential element to 
any finding of fact to be made by a court. There exists many a situation or series of 
circumstances that do not rise to the level of indifferent disregard, and such lack of willfulness 
could be viewed as good cause or just cause to avoid imposition of any form of judicial 
contempt. 
In this case, the Hearing Officer was predisposed to utilize a "regulalory" defmition of 
what constitutes "good cause", as was set forth in the notice of intent of suspend license, and did 
not proceed to address the required elements of "willfulness" in any examination of why the 
court order had not been performed. This defmed good cause pursuant to IDAPA 16.03.03.604, 
was the only allowed analysis, and if Appellant was 11ot within one of the four definitions of 
good cause, the elements of willfulness were deemed irrelevant. It was conceded Appellant 
could not meet the criteria of good cause as defied by that regulation, and took issue with that 
inadequate definition and reserved all issues and defenses, to be raised in Appellant's written 
response to the entire course of action taken by the Department. 
The Hearing Officer thereupon allowed a briefing schedule to take place, upon 
Appellant's request to address a number of issues, and following that process, the Hearing 
Officer issued the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Preliminary Decision on February 
24, 2006. Following firther proceedings, a Final Decision and Order were issued by the 
Department on June 8, 2006, that maintained and adopted the Preliminary Decision of the 
Hearing Officer. 
Appellant timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review of that Order with the District Court 
on July 6, 2006, and pwsuant to Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review a Memorandum 
Decision was entered by the assigned District Judge, Retired Senior District Judge, D. Duff 
McKee, on June 13, 2007, finding there was no reason to disturb the Department's Order, and 
the Decision of the Department was affirmed. 
The matter was timely appealed to this Appellate Court in an effort to address the 
concerns raised over the decision rendered by the Department of Health and Welfare Hearing 
Examiner, Edward C. Lockwood, over the available use of FLLSA to address this punishment of 
a proposed license suspension over child support arrearages, and whether there exists a IawfUI 
basis for the suspension of Appellant's driving rights, pursuant to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law found and entered by the Hearing Officer as identified in the Record. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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"%ld%isi$n. See Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 836,70 
P.3d 667, 674 (2003); Brett v. Eleventh Street Dockowner's Ass'a, 141 Idaho 517, 112 P.3d 805 
(2005); Willigv. State Dep't of Health & Welfare, I27 Idaho 259,261, 899 P.2d 969,971 (1995); 
Boise Group Homes, Inc, v. Idaho Dep't of Health & WeVelfre, 123 Idaho 908,909, 854 P.2d 251, 
252 (1993); Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59,61,83 1 P.2d 527,529 (1992). 
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stand&&. If these standards are not met, the agency action ". . . shall be set aside, in whole or in 
part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary" in accordance with the Cowt's 
oaf~gs2q&. Idaho Code $ 67-5279(3); see also Sapi l low,  Inc., 138 Idaho at 836, 70 P.3d at 
674; see Brett v. Eleventh Street Dockowner's Ass 'n, supra. 
. . . . . . . . 
The Idaho Department of Health and~e l f a re ,  and the ~ e ~ a r t m e n t  of ~rans~ortation are 
... 
agencies. subject to review and subsequent appellate review. See Peterson v. Frunklin Coainty, 
130 Idaho 176,938 P.2d 1214 (1997); 5 67-5201 (2), Idaho Code. 
Judicial review is confmed to the record, and the reviewing court does not substitute its 
cr-~. ."-i73;--"-.-.'i , , -. . J u a g m e n t T ~ r ~ , & & t ~ ~ ~ $ i ~ ~ a ~ ~ $ $ ~ ~ $ $ ~ $ g g ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ S t i g ~ ~ , ~ f ~ : @ ~ t {  Bo jse Group Homes, 123 
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Idaho at 909,854 P.2d at 252; Dovel, 122 Idaho at 61,831 P.2d at 529; Morgan v. Idaho Dep'f of 
Health & Weyare, 120 Idaho 6, 8-9, 813 P.2d 345, 347-48 (1991); Brett v. Eleventh Street 
Dockowner's Ass 'n, supra. 
Findings of fact must be based upon substantial evidence, not conjecture, speculation or 
matters not in the Record (see 3 67-5279 (3)(d)) and cannot be based on any arbitrary or 
capricious belief, or the result of an abuse of discretion. See § 67-5279 (3)(e), Idaho Code. 
The Administrative Code, as established in Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code, does 
provide for an aggrieved person to seek judicial review and a right of appeal of any act, order or 
proceeding of an agency. See § 67-5270, Idaho Code. 
The reviewing court may reverse or modify the agency act or decision if substantial rights 
of the parties have been prejudiced by administrative findings which violate constitutional or 
statutory provisions, or are in excess of authority, or made upon unlawful procedure, or are 
clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or capricious. See Greenj?eld Village Apts. v. Ada County, I30 
Idaho 207,938 P.2d 1245 (1997); Idaho County v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 128 
Idaho 846, 920 P.2d 62 (1996); Idaho Watersheds Project, Inc. v. State Board of Land Com'rs, 
128 Idaho 761, 918 P.2d 1206 (1996); Skyview - Hazeldel, Inc., v Idaho Department of Health 
and Welfare, 128 Idaho 756,918 P.2d 1201 (1996); 5 67-5279 (4), Idaho Code. 
If the Court cannot find substantial evidentiary support for the administrative agency's 
decision, the Court must reverse the decision or remand the case for further proceedings 
necessary to establish or complete a record. See generally Greenfied Village Apts. v. Ada 
County, supra. 
The Court exercises &ee review over all questions of Iaw and any legal conclusions 
reached by the agency. See Qualman v. State Department of Employment, 129 Idaho 92, 922 
P.2d 389 (1996); Crooks v. Inland 46.5 Ltd Partnership, 129 Idaho 43,921 P.2d 743 (1996). 
Erroneous conclusions of law made by an agency may be corrected on appeal. See 
Peterson v. Franklin County, supra; Love v. Board of County Comm 'rs of Bingharn County, 105 
Idaho 558, 671 P.2d 417 (1983); Vbn Jones v. Board of County Com 'rs, Cassia County, 129 
Idaho 683 931 P.2d 1201 (1997); Greenj?eld Village Apts. v. Ada County, supra. 
A decision cannot rest on speculation or conjecture. Peterson v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 
652, 448 P.2d 653, 658 (1968); Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46, 844 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct. App. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
WHETHER THE NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO SUSPEND THE DRIVER'S 
LICENSE OF APPELLANT, CONTAINING AN ADMZNISTRATIVE REGULATION 
ALLOWING FOR EXEMPTIONS OF "GOOD CAUSE", CONSTITUTES AN 
ELIMINATION OF THE JUDICIAL ELEMENTS ESSENTIAL FOR ENFORCEMENT 
OF COURT ORDERS, AND IF THAT BE THE CASE, HAS APPELLANT BEEN 
DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND NOTIFICATION REQUIRED TO 
PROTECT HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE THIS 
PROPERTY RIGHT FROM APPELLANT, BEING DRIVER'S LICENSE, UNDER THE 
FLLSA LEGISLATION. 
WHETHER THE PROPER AUTHORITY VESTED I N  THE HEARING OFFICER HAS 
BEEN EXERCISED UNDER IDAPA 16.05.03.131. 
IV. 
WHETHER THE FAMILY LAW LICENSE SUSPENSION ACT (FLLSA) IS 
AMBIGUOUS AND VOID FOR VAGUENESS, AND MUST BE HELD TO BE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
WHETHER THE FAMILY LAW LICENSE SUSPENSION ACT (FLLSA) IS BEING 
APPLJED CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST EX- 
POST FACT0 APPLICATION OF LEGISLATION. 
VI. 
WHETHER THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF A FINDING OF NO ACTION 
TAKEN BY THE LICENSING AUTHORITY, AFTER REFERRAL OF 
DELINQUENCY, HAS BEEN PROPERLY MADE. 
VII. 
WHETHER JUDICIAL PROCESS IS THE PROPER FORUM TO ENFORCE FLLSA. 
ARGUMENT PRESENTED ON ISSUES ON APPEAL 
WHETHER THE NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO SUSPEND THE DRIVER'S 
LICENSE OF APPELLANT, CONTAINING AN ADMTNISTRATTVE REGULATION 
ALLOWING FOR EXEMPTIONS OF "GOOD CAUSE", CONSTITUTES AN 
ELIMINATION OF THE JUDICIAL ELEMENTS ESSENTIAL FOR ENFORCEMENT 
OF COURT OWERS, AND IF THAT BE THE CASE, HAS APPELLANT BEEN 
DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND NOTIFICATION REQUIRED TO 
PROTECT HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
The Notification of Intent to Suspend Appellant's Driver's License, referenced in Exhibit 
G of this documentary record in this case, has incorporated within it an administrative regulation 
that seeks to define exemptions for "good cause", and that is suggested to be the only acceptable 
criteria to be considered for non-payment, or an accrued arrearage. That definition, referring to 
"Good Cause", lists four (4) allowed exemptions, and given as the only basis or element to be 
considered in such proceedings that qualify in a determination in any License Suspension 
proceeding under the State's enforcement of this FLLSA statute, Title 7, Chapter 14, enacted 
January 1, 1997, called the Family Law License Suspension Act (FLLSA). Nowhere within the 
entire statutory enactment is there found a "Legislative" definition of "good cause", or the 
elements to be addressed in a hearing or a legislative declaration that the judicial requirements of 
"willfulness", and deliberate indifferent disregard of a court order are a requirement in any 
finding for the enforcement of the Act. Nowhere, as a matter of State law, or by statutory 
language, is it authorized that punishment involves the deprivation of an established "property 
right." The use of that regulatory defiition of "good cause", as an exemption to enforcement 
appears to have been developed by or for use by the Department of Health and Welfare. Such 
regulation, as presently structured, provides only an inappropriate and very narrow window of an 
exemption of good cause, excusing a licensee's inability to pay or be cnrrent on his child 
support, and such regulation appears to eliminate the essential elements currently recognized 
when considering circumstances of contempt and punishment criteria of willfulness and 
deliberate indifferent disregard of court orders, which requires consideration of elements beyond 
those four categories of exemption as specified therein as a threshold requirement of any due 
process punishment for failwe to comply with a court order. 
. . . . . . . 
.-.... 
.. 
maho cCit$---ha've addressed this crucial element of "willfUlncss" in contempt 
. . .  . 
. .  . .  . .  . . . 
..... .-. . 
. . 
. . . . . . . . 
1244 (1997). BiGuse Idaho's contempt statute was derived from the California statute, our . .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . 
cobs tuiiied t6 California case law to addressthe ~ i t l e r  case, and isidCalifornia case authority 
. . .  
to-interpj;~i~daho's contempt statute on the required element of "willfulness~, and that has now ~ 
defind the standard t o  be applied in Idaho 'when . . considering a person's ' failure to obey' or 
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c o ~ m ~ X i & & r  . 
The standard adopted by Idaho courts was whether the failure to obey a court order 
displayed a deliberate indifferent disregard for the-duty to promptly obey court orders. See 
In Re Stanley, 114 Cal.App.3d 588, I70 Cal.Rptr. 755 (1981); In Re KarpJ; 10 Cal.App.3d 355, 
88 Ca1.Rptr. 895 (1970). The California Supreme Court also described it as "a remissness and 
failure in performance of duty ... coupled with the ability to perform." See Lyom v. Superior 
Court, 43 CalZd 755,278 P.2d 681,683 (1955). 
Consequently, the "indifferent disregard of a duty" was held to be the proper standard for 
determining "wil1fulness", and willfutaess is a critical element in analyzing an individual's 
compliance with a court order, and it is the standard of "indifferent disregard", and deliberate 
indifferent disregard that must be applied when looking at a person's failure to obey a court 
order, whether it be a contempt proceeding straight out, or a quasi-contempt proceeding, where a 
license suspension is the intended punishment to be imposed for failing to comply with the court 
order. In this case, before Appellant could have been found to have failed to comply with the 
duty to pay child support under these court orders, there must be a finding of a deliberate 
"indifferent disregard of a duty" by a parent of a minor child in his failure to pay support, and it 
must be found he had the ability to do so, and deliberately disregarded that duty, despite his 
ability to perform. 
To that end, therefore, the administrative Hearing Officer must find Appellant acted with 
an indifferent disregard of his duty to pay support, and that Appellant had the ability to perform 
the duty, but deliberately failed to do so. 
There is no statutory defmition in FLLSA relating to this required fmding or the duty 
imposed, and no mention is made within the Act that would dispense with this due process 
requirement for the fmding of an element of willfulness to demonstrate deliberate indifferent 
disregard, before the Hearing Officer can punish with any form of a license suspension. The 
"regulatory" defmition of exemptions does not address the required element of the Hearing 
Officer to fmd an "indifferent disregard" of the court order, and carving out four exceptions to 
the "enforcement" of a court order, does not eliminate the standard of review, or required fmding 
of essential elements, when you do choose to pursue enforcement of the order. This enactment 
does not introduce a new concept to the idea of how to enforce court orders; rather the regulation 
tells us what exceptions apply to enforcement, and when you cannot enforce the order, but if 
none of the regulatory exceptions apply, then the standard of established elements must be 
identified and pursued, if you are then seeking to enforce the order. Now, assuming you can 
enforce the court order, there must be a fmding of "willfulness" and the corresponding elements, 
which includes "deliberate indifferent disregard" for the duty to perform, and the presence of an 
ability to perform the intended objective of that court order. The elements of such process must 
be given in the Notification, so an individual can understand the consequences of his failure to 
obey the court order, similar to the due process requirements for the advice of consequences 
addressed in in Re G@th License, 113 Idaho 364,744 P.2d 92 (1987) and Matter of Beem, 119 
Idaho 289, 805 P.2d 495 (1991). Those cases dealt with a driver's license, and the procedural 
due process that must be afforded them, before a license can be subjected to a suspension for 
failure to comply with a duty to submit to an evidentiary test. Whether it be a statutory duty to 
perform an obligation, or a judicial duty to comply with a court order, there must be proper 
notification of your rights, elements of proof, and consequences for a willful and deliberate 
indifferent disregard to obey the court order, if you do not fit within one of the four regulatoty 
exemptions for enforcement ofa  court order. If you don't address those fundamental elements in 
I 
the Notification when seeking enforcement of a court order, and the aspects of disobedience are 
not revealed, then we have an arbitrary and capricious assessment of what is or will be the 
required elements that must be considered when seeking to impose some form of punishment for 
a failure of compliance. Since the focus of the punishment imposed here was the deprivation of 
a property right, it is being done without considering the established elements recognized in the 
law, and it constitutes a due process violation of a fundamental right of notification and 
opportunity to be heard on the element of willfulness. 
The plain wording of the regulation demonstrates a significant departure from the focus 
judicially required for review of the elements of willfulness and disregard, and absent a finding 
of willfulness, good cause also exists for not suspending a license. Notification that willfulness 
must be an element to be proven in such a suspension proceeding is a critical aspect of advice 
that must be given to anyone against whom a notification of proposed suspension is directed, as 
that constitutes a form of "exemption" to the effects of enforcement, and they have a right to 
know that element of good cause, as historically applied in all judicial settings of child support 
enforcement and delinquency cases. These regulations are void of the fundamental and 
traditional circumstance of due process that require elements of some aspect of misconduct or 
fault, that by such limited notification, precludes the ability to excuse situations resulting in an 
accruing delinquency of a support obligation that demonstrates the absence of the essential 
element of willfulness. This historic judicial due process and procedure has been regarded as a 
well formulated basis of a required due process judicial analysis, to decide whether some level of 
punishment is ever justified. Any attempt to take a license to drive, must be considered a form of 
punishment being imposed for some level of a willful and indifferent disregard of a court order, 
because a driver's license, at least in Idaho, has been established to be a "property right" as 
specifically defined by Idaho Law, and it cannot be infringed upon or disrupted in any 
unconstitutional manner, which must include proper notice and a process that would include the 
historically cautious concerns of the right of due process, and the needed analysis which has 
correctly utilized a judicially developed definition of misbehavior, or contemptuous conduct, that 
is clearly shown to be a willful indifferent disregard of the order, as a prerequisite that supports a 
finding of "good cause" under existing case law, especially as it affects a "property right". This 
idea of a property right has been announced long ago by our Supreme Court. See Adams v. City 
of Pocateldo, 91 Idaho 99, 416 P.2d 46 (1966). Any defmition of "good cause" that fails to 
incorporate the presence of the essential elements of the judicial process that requires "willful 
contempt" that requires a finding of indifferent disregard as the basis for the failure to obey the 
judicial order of support, would appear to constitute a procedural infringement of notice on a 
constitutional due process right, and should be regarded as an unconstitutional inkingement upon 
an established liberty interest as well as a property right. By the denial of any notification of 
those "judicially" defined precautions that are tantamount to any idea of "good cause", that 
failure of notification should constitute a violation of a Licensee's constitutional rights and civil 
rights as protected by both FederaI and State Law. 
The election of the Department to apply such restricted definition of an exemption to 
enforcement is misleading, as it fails to include the absence of willfulness as constituting good 
cause also, and this failure to include such a defmed good cause by the Department's regulations, 
appear to be neither statutorily authorized, nor supported by any established case law. There has 
never been any statutorily endorsed enactment by the Idaho Legislature as a controlling or 
qualifying definition of good cause, and no enabling clause was expressed to allow differently 
when the present enactment was adopted and put into effect January 1, 1997. Had the 
Legislature attempted to establish a definition of "good cause" as formulated by these drafted 
department regulations, they could have chosen to do so, and had they done so, the enactment 
would become subject to constitutional scrutiny, and would include reference to the essential 
element of willfulness, and such an effect would allow for the exemption &om suspension, a 
failure that was not found to be a willful indifferent disregard of the court order. The Legislature 
would have had it Judicial Committee address the essential elements of failing to obey a court 
order, a "judicial" setting, and such notification would have been addressed as to willfulness. 
There is no other sensible way to view the need for notification to an individual if he is exposed 
to an element of "punishment", because of a failure to comply with a court order. He must be 
informed punishment in any form cannot be imposed until there has been a due process 
proceeding and showing of willfulness, as defined by law as it affects contemptuous behavior 
towards a court order. To do it any other way is to incite the use of arbitrary and capricious 
assessments for allowing punishments to be imposed, without due process notification. Civil 
procedural due process rights and liberty interests require notification that a finding of a "willW 
contempt", is a key component in addressing what is allowed as a good cause concept, and this 
restricted allowance under the regulations, viewed as a regulatory exception only, is in 
contradiction to the judicial requirement of the elements as well as proper notification, judicially 
defined willful contempt is required, and the clear presence of an ongoing ability to pay the 
regular support, and the absence of a financial disability or disruption in fmances that would 
cause or contribute to the inability to comply with a Court Order of Support. The conjunction 
and confluence of significant concerns, such as due process, equal protection, proper notification, 
and liberty interests and property rights are at issue, and these matters are judicially developed 
mandates that are critical elements that must be present before any form of punishment can be 
imposed, or any property deprivation, or any remedial disruption of a property right, civil right, 
or liberty interest is allowed to take place. Unless some amendment has been made to the initial 
enactment of FLLSA, the legislation appears to be void of definition required to address what is 
or can be shown to be "good cause", and it remains void of any. expression to properly define the 
procedural protections that must be judicially recognized in the context of "good cause", and it 
cannot be allowed to exist in such a regulatory vacuum of these four limited exceptions, as that is 
contrary to existing and well-established case law that a lack of willfulness is a showing of good 
cause as well. The phrase and limitations to the constraints of the "administratively" created 
definition of "good cause" in such Department regulation cannot be construed to take an effect, 
or preempt the judicially recognized analysis of a good cause, when there is a lack of willfulness 
and indifferent disregard, and especially when the regulation is intended to be applied as the 
"sole" expression on what is good cause as an exception to enforcement of a court order for 
failure to obey. 
The Health and Welfare regulations were neither adopted nor approved as a controlling 
definition; there creation either supersedes or avoids any judicial language to be used in this 
remedial statute, and because the restrictively narrow application is inconsistent, and contrary to 
all historic use of the phrase of good cause under Idaho case law, it cannot be exclusively used 
nor allowed to become the controlling criteria in these proceedings, when punisbment by 
deprivation of a property right is being used to enforce the court order. The regulatory definition 
cannot be considered the only exception to enforcement, and serves to contradict the well- 
established definition utilized within the Judicial System, when it comes to what is required 
when you undertake enforcement. When applying the conventional definition of "good cause" to 
efforts of enforcement, you must proceed to properly address the well-established law in support 
review proceedings with the necessary conjunctive action required in a legal context to include 
the unconditional requirement and presence of willfuhess and a behavior of misconduct that 
demonstrates an indifferent disregard, and actual contempt on the part of the obligator, together 
with a demonstration of an unrestricted and unimpaired ability to pay the support as was 
previously ordered. In the historic context of good cause, defined and applied in judicial 
proceedings, historically any extended fmancial disability or fmancial impairment is an 
excusable basis and does meet the establishment of good cause, and though it is not exempted 
under the regulation, nonetheless it is and must be excused under such an existing state of events 
in the required judicial setting where there is an absence of a finding of willfulness. There could 
be no actual contempt of a court order to authorize punishment or infringe upon any right or 
interest if there is no willfulness found in the failure to obey. "Court Orders" is what the 
Department of Health and Welfare is seeking to enforce, or use as the predicate basis to infringe 
upon a license, and these court orders must be reviewed and analyzed by the elements used by 
courts, and must include good cause found under court-type analysis, in the required judicial 
setting. 
When court orders exist, they are to be followed, but there should be NO 
"administrative" review of a court order, that has not included proper constitutional 
considerations that require a fiding of willfulness. Though an administrative avenue is not a 
judicial avenue, that agency is not authorized to ignore what a court has found to be good cause 
shown, and a review should not be handed off to an administrative process when one element of 
good cause (the absence of any willfulness in the failure to perform the court order) has been 
excluded, and such protective requirements axe not being applied in an administrative 
environment, let alone correctly, when it affects a property right, a civil right, a liberty interest, 
or a procedural due process right of notification, and to do so in such a contrary fashion in this 
remedial or punishment setting, contrary to existing Idaho law, and without regard to the 
meaning of willfulness, good cause, and the elements required in the enforcement of court 
orders, is a violation of a due process of law. 
To the extent the definition of good cause identified in the regulation exemptions is 
inconsistent with, limited, or is to be exclusively applied by virtue of the Department's 
regulations, when it comes to the process of what is good cause when enforcing court orders, 
then such an attempt must be regarded unduly restrictive and be regarded as void-for-vagueness, 
and non-controlling in the lawful use of this remedial legislation. It cannot be allowed to obviate 
the judicial requirements so well-established in the enforcement of Judicial orders; it cannot be 
applied to the extent it prevents or limits the lawful use of financial disability and recognized 
good cause defenses, which traditionally and lawfully include a state of near term or extended 
financial disability that prevents the imposition of any punitive or remedial action in any judicial 
fonun, and must limit any administrative or non-judicial forum &om modifying the required 
elements of good cause in any child support enforcement proceedings in an administrative 
setting, addressing court orders. 
The extent to which the Department's Hearing Officer chose to limit good cause to the 
specified circumstances set forth in the Department regulations, is clearly inadequate, as a matter 
of disclosing what is good cause under the law, and such limitation cannot be the basis of my 
Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law in regard to the enforcement of the order(s) as it would 
constitute a violation of protected legal rights of due process and equal protection as recognized 
under the Idaho Constitution, Federal Constitution and State law, by prior judicial precedent. 
The absence of any reference to the absence of a finding of willfulness within the 
definition of what is "good cause", either as an exception or as a condition of enforcement, by 
the enactment of 9 7-1402, Idaho Code, would indicate contradiction to existing judicially 
enunciated elements for court order enforcement from prior case history, and when the 
Legislature has not adopted any department regulation or promulgated the meaning of good 
cause, it must be found to be outside the scope of the legislative intent, and the enactment 
becomes even more vague as a result thereof. 
WHETIXER THE DEPARTMENT HAS TEE AUTHORITY TO TAKE THIS 
PROPERTY RIGHT FROM APPELLANT, BEING A DRIVER'S LICENSE, UMlER 
THE FLLSA LEGISLATION. 
Another significant issue before this Court is the improper attempt by the Department to 
claim a right to take from this Appellant, or any other individual, a well-established "property 
right" announced by Idaho case law of long-established judicial precedent, when it is actually 
protected, or is to be protected by the intent of the statute. Spec@cally see Adams v. Ciry of 
Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 416 P.2d 46 (1966). The defmition of 'license' is being improperly 
characterized by the Department, and the clear intent of the FLLSA stalute is being violated, as 
the defmition of 'license' as used within FLLSA, does not include a license that has been 
declared to be a property right. Specifcal$ see 5 7-1402(5)(d)). As the definition is set forth in 5 
7-1402(5)(d), Idaho Code, this enactment specifically excludes application to any license that 
does "constitute a property right", and to allow the Department to do otherwise would violate a 
constitutionaIly protected property right, and by virtue of that concern should be viewed as an 
unconstitutional infringement upon a license declared to be property rights under either Federal 
or State Law. Because the definition on this enactment states that a license must be of a nature 
that does not constitute a property right, it cannot apply to a driver's license in Idaho because of 
,, 
Adams, supra. Such declaration is squarely in contradiction with existing Idaho law. Idaho case 
1 authority has consistently held that a driver's license is a 'property right', not just a mere 
privilege, as we hear said so often, and as such does constitute a property interest, which must be 
I 
granted the respect and required degree of due process, with proper protection afforded in the 
environment of established judicial process that considers the elements of willfulness, deliberate 
indifferent disregard, and ability to perform. Any attempt to incorporate into this enactment an 
inconsistent defmition of license, so as to include those of a property right as defined withim 
existing Idaho case law, enunciated by the Idaho Supreme Court, would render such remedial 
defmition to be viewed as ambiguous and void-for-vagueness, as it is specifically declared to be 
excluded. The underlying enactment would become unconstitutional if it made any broad 
sweeping attempt to ignore the Adams case, and therefore should be viewed as unenforceable. 
The Department's attempt to do so as an agency only, cannot be regarded judicial, and an 
administrative officer cannot take a license that constitutes a property interest that exists by law 
in such a license, as defined by law, and the status of such an established property right is clear, 
and to do so would violate this judicially pronounced and protected property right and interest 
under Idaho Law. The Department and its Hearing Officer cannot outwardly disregard the 
meaning and impact of Adums v. Cify of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99,416 P.2d 46 (1966). To fmd as 
part of the definition of a "license", to be that which cannot include a license that has been 
declared a "property right", and to attempt to do otherwise, then this very statutory language is 
being arbitrarily and capriciously applied, as there is an attempt to interpret it for that wrongful 
and unlawful consequences, and it must not be so enforced, and the Department has chosen to 
wrongilly apply the statute, as it specifically excludes it. (Again See 5 7-1402(5)(d), Idaho 
Code). Any attempt to deprive or divest a person of a property right or a liberty interest without 
the required judicial procedural due process, or a legislatively established form of due process, is 
I 
improper. A driver's license can be suspended, revoked, modified or restricted only by the DOT 
for those specific reasons as allowed by applicable statute, and under those judicially recognized 
and statutorily created causes and defmitions, but any attempt to do so under FLLSA would 
I 
commit a civil rights violation under both Idaho Constitution and under Federal Law. The right 
to operate a motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways has routinely been declared a 
"property right" and not just a privilege, as all too fkequently suggested since Adams 
I 
announcement 40 years ago, and as a right, it becomes defined as having attached to it certain 
I 
liberty interests, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantee of the Federal and State 
Constitution. See Arrow Tramportation Co. v. IPUC, 85 Idaho 307,379 P.2d 422 (1963); State 
v. Kouni, 58 Idaho 493, 76 P. 2d 917 (1938); Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho 427, 262 P. 881 
I 
I (1927); and Adarns v. City of Pocate210,supra 101. 
Any Administrative analysis conducted with the use of this legislation cannot disrupt 
what a court of competent jurisdiction has announced to be a property right, and must apply any 
statutory construction within the plain language of § 7-1402 (5) (d), and if an administrative 
officer were to conclude a license to operate a motor vehicle ( 5  7-1402 (5) (c) is some how 
allowed to escape the exclusionary language of a property right of a driver's license under part 
d), and should attempt to pursue the application of a driver's license under part (c) to the 
enactment, and suspend under the proposed remedial enforceability of the legislation in light of 
the clear violation of a protected property right and liberty interest, as defined by law, that would 
then appear to be a violation of the statute, based upon a latent ambiguity of part (c) and (d). The 
possibIe contradictory definition of what is to be included as a "license" set forth in 8 7-1402, 
Idaho Code, clearly affecting a constitutionally protected property right, especially if it is 
intended for application against Court Orders that do not relate to public assistance and public 
assistance matters, must be struck down as being vague and void for vagueness, and constitutes 
an unconstitutional infringement upon our declared property right that exists in a Driver's 
License. The Department's Hearing Offtcer cannot violate the constitution, even if it is the 
Department's belief the Hearing Officer has no authority to address constitutional issues under 
its administrative capacity. 
WHETHER THE PROPER AUTHORITY VESTED IN THE HEARZNG OFFICER HAS 
BEEN EXERCISED UNDER IDAPA 16.05.03.131. 
The cloak of authority vested in any Hearing Officer, conducting a license suspension 
proceeding, is identified in IDAPA 16.05.03.131, though of interest, we find it is not a model of 
clarity in itself. The "authority" granted or vested in the Hearing Officer is contained in that rule 
format generated by the I d a 0  Department of Administration, and begins by saying the Hearing 
OMicer has neither the jurisdiction nor the authority to "invalidate" a Federal statute, a State statute, 
a promulgated rule or regulation, or any existing court order. He is not authorized to act in a judicial 
capacity. The Hearing Officer, however, is instructed to give "deference" to the Department's 
(Health and Welfare) "interpretation" of statutes, rules, regulations and policies, at the same time 
trying not to fill the function of being merely a rubber-stamp. That deference given, however, is 
overcome when the Hearing Officer determines the Department's "interpretation" constitutes an 
abuse of discretion when it is, or should be found to be contrary to existing law or statute. Clearly, 
there is authority for the Hearing Officer to invalidate the "interpretation" proposed by the 
Department, and that does cloak the Hearing Officer with authority to invalidate such an 
interpretation that constitutes an unreasonable or unconstitutional application, or a position that is 
obviously contrary to statute (or law). The Appellant's concern here is that we fmd the Department 
I 
taking an inappropriate position on matters of law, by disregarding the statute's exclusion to taking 
property rights, and disregarding the clear judicial history that the absence of willfulness in not 
performing a court order is good cause, as a matter of law. 
This Court must appreciate the intended purpose of the authority granted a Hearing Officer 
in an administrative proceeding is clearly to be distinguished from that authorization vested within 
the judiciary, and to that end, the authority is limited so as to prevent an administrative officer 
attempting to enter into the judicial arena by use of the administrative process. That being said, the 
fact remains the Hearing Officer must interpret a statute and resulting good cause according to law, 
and must apply principles of law in a way consistent to the intended purpose of court rulings on 
rights and interests, and must apply a statute in a manner that would be consistent with its 
constitutionality, and to do otherwise would serve to perpetuate, in itself, an abuse of discretion that 
would permit a statutory interpretation contrary to its purpose, intent or not in conformirj with the 
applicable law. Since the Hearing Officer is not designed to be a rubber-stamp, the fimction must 
include the undertaking of a methodical analysis of the applicable statutes, case law, and what is 
required in the enforcement of court orders, and from that process, make certain they are 
procedurally and constitutionally applied, and to any extent the Department's interpretation is 
found to be c o n w  thereto or is a discretionary abuse of a constitutional right, then such deference 
must be rejected, as only a lawful and constitutional application sball be made. A Hearing Officer is 
not cloaked with authority to either established case law or the means by which a statute is to 
be interpreted. If the Department would seek to disregard lawfuI definitions of "property rights", 
judicial analysis in court order enforcement proceedings, "good cause", and established standards 
for statutory interpretation, then it becomes the subject of concern the Hearing Officer's disregard is 
both contrary to statute and to established law, and does represent an abuse of discretion that is 
I being advanced by the Department. Clearly, the Hearing Officer is required to make a 
constitutional application of the law and apply the established standards in any statutory 
interpretation that is to be addressed in this matter, regardless of the Department's attempt to ignore 
I 
I the established law on rights and cause. 
It is critical a Hearing Officer must engage its authority fully and appropriately, so the issues 
I 
as were raised by an Appellant-Licensee for W e r  proceedings under the Adminispative 
Procedures Act that provides for judicial review. 
WHETHER THE FAMILY LAW LICENSE SUSPENSION ACT (FLLSA) IS 
AMBIGUOUS AM) VOID FOR VAGUENESS, AND MUST BE HELD TO BE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, 
There does appear, with little or no doubt, the Family Law License Suspension Act 
(FLLSA), as codified January 1, 1997, contains contradictions in a material and substantial manner, 
I as they say no exceptions, then make exceptions, or create some form of an exemption, and 
produces no rational relationship to its intended purpose. The FLLSA could be interpreted to be 
consistent and non-contradictory, but to do so you must disregard the ambiguity and areas of 
vagueness. We know a determination has been made that, as a matter of law, a motor vehicle 
driver's license in the State of Idaho is a property right and constitutes a "property interest", as 
before determined by the Idaho Supreme Court in 1966. The FLLSA appears to have recognized 
that property rights do exist, and acknowledged that in its defmition of what does not constitute a 
suspendable license. The statute can be interpreted to be consistent when you understand that 
licenses, as defined in that chapter, are to be only the ones that are subject to suspension, and the 
statute applies only to those licenses defined to be those that do not constitute a property interest by 
virtue of a vested properly right or judicial decree. But the Department has ignored that, and sought 
to capitalize upon that ambiguity because of the language in paragraphs (c) and (d) of 5 7-1402, 
Idaho Code. The idea that "the Legislature intends that there be no exceptions to the licenses" could 
easily be interpreted under the legislative interpretation standards to mean there shall be no age 
distinction, no gender distinction, or no official status exception (such as a governor, department 
head, legislator or some other level or degree of that class of licensee), and they are to be treated 
equally across the board, just as long as the licensee involved fits the definition, which definition 
does not include any form of license that is a property right. Now we know as a matter of law since 
1966, that a driver's license is a property right, and that has been established case law in Idaho 
continuously, without exception, since 1966, and that concept has neither been overruled nor 
challenged. The licenses subject to suspension must meet the definition contained in the chapter, 
and it would be improper to say a "defmition" is construed to be or become an "exception". The 
statutory language must be understood, construed and interpreted together, and the Legislature 
means that there will be no exception allowed to a license that, by defmition, is subject to 
suspension, and those licenses are defmed in the statute and by defmition the license cannot include 
that which constitutes a property right. Clearly, a property right cannot be infringed upon, and 
cannot be taken without due and just compensation, as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
This Hearing Officer has no authority to interpret the statute in a manner inconsistent with 
established case law or in a fashion that is contrary to that which is known to constitute a property 
right, as a matter of law, and the law should be clear a Hearing Officer has no authority togive 
deference to the Department's desire to ignore and disregard established law. 
There shall be no preferential treatment among those licensees (whether regulatory or 
revenue generating) who fall within the category of a defined license, subject to suspension. It 
would be contrary to statutory interpretation to choose to exclude the very essence of a defmition 
that actually is the basis for what is comprised to be the subject matter of the very legislation in 
question. We know the Department has a habit of disregarding legal defmitions, as their regulations 
addressing the notification of what constitutes good cause demonstrates that. The Department 
would propose their regulatory exemption of four elements of "good cause" that applies to prevent 
the enforcement of orders is exhaustive, but then if they choose proceed to the enforcement of the 
order, they fail to give notification about the requirement of willfulness, because of their own policy 
or rule making to disregard it. They disregard what is required as the element of willfilness when 
you undertake enforcement of court orders. That disregard is being abused by the Department, as 
the Department would require the Hearing Officer to ignore the absence of willfulness as being 
another category of good cause, and for a hearing officer to engage in a process, contrary to what is 
existing law, and to enter into the process of a discretionary abuse, by avoiding well-established 
I law, is inviting arbitrary and capricious conduct, and therefore becomes unconstitutional. These 
I 
Department efforts also have the effect of making the defmition of a "property right" and "good 
cause" meaningless concepts when engaging in the judicial analysis of the elements of enforcement 
I and suspendable licenses, and a Hearing Officer is not vested with authority to "avoid" the law, but 
to the contrary, must apply it, as it is established by the judicial process. Maybe he cannot 
I 
1 invalidate a statute or a constitutional provision, but he cannot ignore the decreed rule of law, as his 
duty is to apply the law as it has been long interpreted, and in a fashion consistent with the 
defmition of good cause and enforce a statute that defioes what license is subject to suspension, and 
I 
I must apply the law that defrnes the elements of what must be analyzed when seeking to enforce 
I court orders, and not just stop the analysis when considering only four exemptions of good cause 
I that preclude review of the element of willfulness in the enforcement of the court order. We fiod a 
Department requesting a hearing ofilcer to apply this FLLSA statute in a manner that is prospective 
I 
and retrospective in natur ating 1997), and we are 
faced with a Department attitude that seeks to unconstitutionally apply a law, and is willing to do so 
without fust getting the licensing agency involved, with the required confuming documentation that 
demonstrates the Department of Transportation refused to take action, or have some established 
basis or authoriw to exempt a driver's license. 
I 
I 
The Hearing Officer is asked to arbitrarily and capriciously apply his authority, and yet he 
1 must get his authority kern FLLSA, and cannot avoid the property right issue of part (d) or the 
existing law on a driver's license under the Adams case, or the absence of will~lness as a good 
cause excuse for noncompliance. When the very definition in this enactment states that a 'license' 
cannot include one that constitutes a property right, yet have or require the Hearing Officer do 
otherwise, it subjects the enforcement to become void-for-vagueness, if that can be allowed to 
I 
occur, and must be held to be unconstitutional if that be an allowed result. When Idaho case 
authority has consistently held that a driver's license is a "property right", it cannot be deprived or 
taken away outside the realm of Department of Transportation due process of law, which has 
8 recognized judicial cause, and that cannot be pre-empted to allow FLLSA interference. 
I Consequently, any attempt to incorporate an inconsistent defmition to existing Idaho Case Law, as 
is enunciated by the Idaho Supreme Court, would create an ambiguous definition, and is 
deliberately being applied in an unconstitutional manner, and the underlying enactment would 
i become unconstitutional and unenforceable if it were to be used to jeopardize a property right of this 
AppeIIant, or any other licensee, as it denies the status of an established properly right and violates a 
I 
protected right and interest under Idaho law. 
Appellant does specifically challenge FLLSA due to its lack of procedural due process, 
lack of required notification and lack of any relationship between the legislation to the intended 
purpose, as it grossly impacts the Equal Protection Clause, the Commerce Clause and the 
Excessive Punishment Clause of the Idaho and United State Constitutions. 
I 
The due process clause of the 1 4 ~ ~  Amendment of the United States Constitution provides 
I 
"no state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty or property without the due process of law", 
I 
I 
I and Article 1 Section 13 provides "No person shall.. .be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law". These constitutional guarantees have both a procedural and 
substantive criteria to it. See Pace v. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581, 586, 726, P. 2d 693 (1986); see 
Hawah Independent School District v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194,59 L. Ed. 2d. 248 (1979). 
In order to infringe upon any property right or liberty interest, there must first exist a rational 
relationship between the legislation and its objective, and it must achieve the rational purpose of the 
legislature. Unfortunately, the efforts to apply FLLSA operates to suspend some form of a license, 
and if a driver's license is to be wrongfully included, it would serve to deprive a licensee of his 
needed means of lawful transportation to conduct his employment responsibilities, which impedes 
his ability to earn a living, and consequently prohibits hi from generating funds to pay his lawful 
obligations, and consequently, any stated purpose within the FLLSA legislation to increase state 
wide child support collections is fully defeated, as unemployment due to interference in commerce 
is counter productive and destroys the underlying objective by creating a situation where there e m  
be no money to collect. Clearly, the effect of any suspension serves only a punitive purpose and 
provides no remedial or equitable result to the purpose intended. The effects of'this deprivation, 
both as to the property right and the due process right, becomes so lacking in any rational sense that 
it becomes unrelated to the intended purpose to be achieved, and the resulting punitive effects are so 
far removed from the intended purpose that it renders FLLSA more characteristic of an arbitrary or 
capricious enactment or tool for arbitrary enforcement, and should be considered unconstitutional 
for all of its inadequate respects. 
WHETHER THE FAMILY LAW LICENSE SUSPENSION ACT (EZLSA) IS BEING 
APPLIED CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST EX- 
I POST FACT0 APPLICATION OF LEGISLATION. 
The current legislative enactment, Family Law License Suspension Act (FLLSA) fails to 
I 
provide any identifiable means of safeguarding procedural due process, and the right to equal 
protection under existing Federal and State law, as no distinction is made to defie the "duration 
of punishment" by imposition of a suspension of a driver's license as proposed. To say the 
I 
Department will cooperate with you on some payment agreement, to allow for reinstatement, is 
I not part of the legislation. It is M e n n o r e  unquestionably unlawful to impose either civil or 
I 
criminal punishment, or infringe upon any constitutional right by means of applying punishment 
I or the deprivation of a constitutionally guaranteed right by the Ex Post Facto effects from 
i 
I subsequent legislation enacted. That, in itself, is a violation of Federal and State law. Any 
attempt to retroactively apply the law to the calculation of any delinquency of support from any 1 
Court Order entered prior to January 1, 1997, would contradict the constitutionality and 
I 
i statutorily protected rights against the Ex Post Facto application of sanctional conduct that was 
not before exposed to such a sanction when the court order was created and entered. See also 
Idaho Code § 73-101. This record indicates the court orders involved in this matter are identified 
as Exhibits A (1995), Exhibit C (1996), and Exhibit E (1995). This record does not show the 
existence of any order entered after the enactment of FLLSA (1997) as the basis for the existence 
I 
of a court created delinquency that would qualify the basis for the imposition of a sanction under 
I this Act. The idea of a possible license suspension of any form of a license, for non-payment of 
a support order, never before existed as a remedial concept to any enforcement of a court order 
1 of support. A licensee has the right to rely upon the situation and state of the law when a Court 
Order is entered, and not be subject to a deprivation of his established property rights and 
interests that were not contemplated at the time the court order for support was entered. Any 
factual Finding and proposed Conclusion of Law in this matter must recognize the violative 
I nature of the retroactive statutory sanction and constitutional prohibition of any Ex Post Facto 
I 
application of such legislation to the deprivation of an existing and protected property right. 
i 
I 
I 
WHETHER THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF A FINDING OF NO ACTION 
TAKEN BY THE LICENSING AUTHORITY, AFTER REFERRAL OF 
DELINQUENCY, RAS BEEN PROPERLY MADE. 
I It does also appear to be a requirement in this FLLSA legislation, pursuant to 5 7-1404, that 
I the Department of Health and Welfare could only become authorized to commence a proceeding 
I 
I 
(against a license, that which does not constitute a property right) and to whatever extent the statute 
is intended to be applied, under this Chapter, only after a licensing authority has taken no action 
within thirty days after a referral of a delinquency by the Department of Health and Welfare . We 
have no "agreement" on this issue in this dispute, and whether the Department of Motor vehicles, 
Department of Transportation, and Department of Health and Welfare have some joint resolution 
agreement on this issue, it is not in the administrative record. There has been no showing at the 
administrative level in this record that any referrai has ever been made to the State of Idaho, 
, 
Department of Transportation, the licensing authority in question, who is the only agency 
empowered initially to commence a license suspension proceedings under this enacted legislation. 
There must be a showing that the licensing authority @ M Y  or DOT) has taken no action by their 
agency after any such claimed notification. The record was clear at the administrative level, before 
I judicial review, that prerequisite had not occurred, so the Department of Health and Welfare had no 
power to commence this action in any fashion under FLLSA. 
I W. 
I WHETHER JUDICIAL PROCESS IS THE PROPER FORUM TO ENFORCE FLLSA. 
It does further appear the Legislature anticipated the actual forum for any such 
I 
I proceeding under FLLSA to be a court of competent jurisdiction, and a court within such f o m  
I would have the judicial obligation to adopt the defiitions affecting enforcement proceedings 
historically recognized and utilized in the judicial system, and would be compelled to recognize 
I 
the judicial and lawful defiition of willfulness, ability to perform, and license has been declared 
1 to be a property right and a constitutionally protected property interest, and such a court would 
I be required, by law, to decline to suspend any such right or to deprive any such protected 
i interest, where judicial good cause exists. The court would be further compelled to declare that 
the enforcement of any suspension of a property right would violate a licensee's civil rights in 
any such attempt to impose or restrict the right vested therein, without just compensation, as to 
be paid under such a due process proceeding. 
Clearly, 8 7-1405 contemplates the "court" (judicial proceeding) and 8 7-1406 requires 
I notice to the licensee by mail when any proceedings for suspension of a statutorily qualifying 
license is commenced. This initiated proceeding in Appellant's case has been Departmental 
only, under an administrative format, void of a "court" proceeding. AppelIant does challenge the 
Health and Welfare's attempts to invoke this suspension process in the manner employed. To 
I I the extent 8 7-1407 provides any administrative authority to Health and Welfare, it clearly 
1 conflicts with the purpose of the court's authority under § 7-1405, if a different concept for good 
cause, elements of enforcement and due process are to be applied, and you cannot have different 
standards in a judicial setting to be different in an administratively ordained setting in FLLSA 
legislation, and to do so would result in creating a conflict in the applicable statutory definition I 
i 
of 5 7-1405. It does further appear FLLSA is subject to a constitutional challenge as it lacks any 
I 
I 
rational relationship to the objective of the legislation. 
I CONCLUSION 
The Hearing Officer has acted arbitrarily, and the effect of which has been capricious, 
and is being applied in an unconstitutional manner. It should have been determined no action 
can be taken by the Department under the existing legislation, against Appellant's Idaho driver's 
license to operate a motor vehicle, not just because it constitutes a property right, but also for the 
I 
reason inadequate notification is given on the criteria of good cause. These proceedings should 
i have been vacated, as to do otherwise would violate this Licensee's property rights as it exists 
under Idaho law, and would contradict the right to the established defense as it relates to the 
elements that pertain to enforcement of court orders, and due process as defmed under existing 
Idaho case authority, and the Act cannot be constitutionally upheld and judicially enforced 
against court orders created before the legislation, when the enactment is void of any savings 
clause, as a matter of law. 
I Respectfully submitted this 4" day of February 2008. 
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